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MAINTAINING THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN
DATE RAPE TRIALS THROUGH THE USE OF LANGUAGE
ORDERS: STATE V. SAFI AND THE BANNING OF THE WORD
"RAPE"
ABSTRACT
This note evaluates the use of language orders in date rape trials
in which the defense is consent through a case study of State v. Safi,
in which Tory Bowen claims that Pamir Safi date raped her. In that
case, the trial judge granted a motion by the defense to prevent the
prosecution and any of their witnesses from using words such as
"rape" and "sexual assault." Using State v. Safi as a starting point,
the author examines the use of such trial orders from the perspec-
tive of both defendants and victims. The author concludes that a mod-
ified version of such language orders would effectively preserve the
presumption of innocence afforded to all criminal defendants with-
out sacrificing a fair opportunity for victims to see their attackers
convicted.
INTRODUCTION
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IV. SOME POINTS ON FEMINIST CRITIQUES OF DATE RAPE TRIALS
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
On the morning of October 31, 2004, Bethany ('Tory") Bowen
says she was raped.1 Her ordeal began on October 30, 2004 when she
and some friends went to a bar in Lincoln, Nebraska called Brothers.2
There, Bowen, a student at the University of Nebraska, met Pamir
Safi, an Army reservist with whom she shared some drinks.3 While
at the bar, Bowen and Safi kissed, and at one a.m. they left Brothers
1. Affidavit of Probable Cause at 1, State v. Safi, No. CR05-87 (Neb. Dist. Ct. Nov. 23,
2004) (on file with author).
2. Paul Hammel, Two Say 'Cleansing' of Court Language Goes Too Far, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD, June 7, 2007, available at http://www.omaha.com/index.php?u-page=
2798&usid=2397636; id. at 1.
3. Meg Massey, Putting the Term 'Rape" on Trial, TIME, July 23, 2007, available at
http://www.time.com/time/ (search by article title; then follow hyperlink).
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together.4 At this point in the night, Bowen's and Safi's stories
diverge. Bowen says the next thing she knew it was morning, she was
covered in vomit, and Safi was in the process of raping her.' When
Bowen asked Safi to stop, he did.6 Bowen has no recollection of meet-
ing Safi.7 Safi says they had consensual sex.' Safi says that to his
knowledge Bowen did not vomit in his home, but he admits that she
"may have vomited a little in his vehicle."9
Lancaster County Attorney Gary Lacey's office decided to pros-
ecute Safi."° In a pretrial conference, Safi's attorney, Clarence Mock,
moved to bar the prosecution from using or eliciting witness testi-
mony containing the words "rape," "sexual assault kit," "victim," and
"assailant."'" The motion was made pursuant to Nebraska Rule of
Evidence 403, which blocks admission of relevant evidence if its
"probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice."12 Lancaster County District Judge Jeffre Cheuvront signed
the order. 1
3
The trial began on October 23, 2006, and on November 6,
Cheuvront declared a mistrial based on a hung jury.14 Seven jurors,
of which five were women, were in favor of conviction. 5 The other
two female jurors voted to acquit Safl. 6 A second trial was scheduled
to begin in July 2007, but it, too, was declared a mistrial, this time
during jury selection.' According to Cheuvront, the intense publicity
surrounding the case made it impossible to select impartial jurors. 8
The third trial will occur sometime in the future, possibly in a differ-
ent county, says Cheuvront. 9
4. See Clarence Mabin, Jurors Saw Witnesses Differently, LINCOLN J. STAR, Nov. 12,
2006, available at http://www.journalstar.com/articles/2006/11/12/local/doc45565b0e3336
fl82485880.txt (recounting trial testimony that Bowen and Safi kissed at the bar).
5. Bowen v. Cheuvront, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1023 (D. Neb. 2007); Affidavit of
Probable Cause, supra note 1, at 1.
6. Dahlia Lithwick, Gag Order, SLATE, June 20, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/
2168758.
7. See Cheuvront, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 1023.
8. Affidavit of Probable Cause, supra note 1, at 1.
9. Id.
10. Hammel, supra note 2.
11. Motion in Limine: Prejudicial Terms at 1, State v. Safi, No. CR05-87 (Neb. Dist.
Ct. Oct. 10, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Motion in Limine].
12. NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-403 (2007).
13. See Cheuvront, 516 F. Supp. 2d at 1024.
14. Id.; Mabin, supra note 4.
15. Hammel, supra note 2.
16. Id.
17. Judge Declares Mistrial in Highly Publicized Rape Case, SIOUX CITY J., July 12,
2007, available at http://www.siouxcityjournal.com/ (follow archive hyperlink; perform
advanced search; follow hyperlink).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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This note argues that State v. Safi2 is a microcosm of the legal
treatment of date rape in today's courtrooms.2' As such, this note
asserts that language orders can prove a useful and necessary tool
for preserving the rights of criminal defendants in date rape trials.
It is a central premise of the American legal system that in trials,
judges will seek to ensure the objectivity and fairness of the adjudi-
cation as much as possible for both parties." Indeed, this is the posi-
tion taken by the defense in State v. Safi - the use of language orders
is necessary to preserve the fairness of the adjudication.23 The Rules
of Evidence, moreover, are designed for a similar end.24 The federal
counterpart to the Nebraska statute, Federal Rule of Evidence 403,25
is a mainstay of today's trial system. The issuance of the language
order in State v. Safi shows that defendants' rights are becoming
important in today's legal system.
In recent decades, defendants have increasingly fallen victim to
rules and treatment, inspired primarily by political correctness, that
shortchange them of their constitutional rights, whether guilty or
not.26 Due to this modern trend, the presumption of guilt against
alleged perpetrators of date rape is already stacked against them in
today's politically correct atmosphere.27
Cheuvront went further, however, than most judges usually do
in making Safi's trial fair for him, namely by barring the word
20. State v. Safi, No. CR05-87 (Neb. Dist. Ct. Oct. 10, 2006).
21. This note focuses solely on rape and date rape where the complainant is female
and the accused is male. By limiting this focus, I do not intend to minimize or ignore
similar issues pertaining to date rape between two men, two women, or when the com-
plainant is a man and the accused is a woman. Rather, I wish to examine the potential
correlation between the "male" nature of the legal system and patriarchy as a whole,
which has historically included sexual domination.
22. See, e.g., NEB. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, § 5-203(5) cmt. (2008) ("A judge must
perform judicial duties impartially and fairly. A judge who manifests bias or prejudice
on any basis in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding and brings the judiciary
into disrepute."). Furthermore, that the accused is innocent until proven guilty is also
"the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation
of the administration of our criminal law." Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453
(1895).
23. Clarence Mabin, Banned Words Debated in Sex Assault Case, LINCOLN J. STAR,
June 17, 2007, available at http://www.journalstar.com/articles/2007/06/17/news/local
doc46745fdc16768519275420.txt.
24. See FED. R. EVID. 102 ('CThese rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-102 (2007) (adopting the language of FED. R.
EVID. 102).
25. FED. R. EviD. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.").
26. See discussion infra Part III.
27. See, e.g., STUART TAYLOR JR. & KC JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT 373 (2007)
("'In the 1970s and 1980s, the pendulum began to swing and we entered an era in which
rape victims were always believed and the defendant was presumed guilty because it
became wrong to question a victim of rape.") (quoting Jim Cooney, attorney for the Duke
lacrosse players acquitted of rape).
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"rape."" This raises the question as to whether too much fairness
can, in fact, be unfair. The other side of the spectrum represented in
this case is the outrage experienced by many Americans caused by
the American legal system's failure to successfully prosecute date
rapists.29 In some instances, the courtroom atmosphere itself seems to
protect the men who prey on innocent women.3" For many American
women, our legal system helps to facilitate date rape, perpetrating
a "second rape" on the victim.3 ' Thus, State v. Safi represents the
need for a careful balancing of the rights of the accused with those
of the accuser.
Underlying this discourse of balancing is an immense ambiv-
alence on the part of the American legal system, and by extension
American society itself, as to what constitutes date rape. 2 A rape
that leaves its victim bruised and bloody is easy to understand, but
a rape, the commission of which might accurately be said to come
down to the subjective issue of consent, is difficult to conceptualize
for some." State v. Safi encapsulates this ambivalence as well as the
complexity of date rape today.
Of central importance in this analysis is the fact that date rape
trials are different than other rape trials.34 In a "pure" example of
date rape, there is no evidence of force; there are no witnesses besides
the complaining witness and the defendant; there may not even have
been a manifestation of protest by the complaining witness. In short,
the crime is nearly unknowable by anyone who was not a party to it.
35
The commission of the crime can theoretically come down to a mis-
communication of intent.'6 That, of course, is not always the case.
28. Lithwick, supra note 6.
29. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 3 (describing the publicity and protests organized
by a rape victim advocacy group outside the courthouse during jury selection for Safi's
second trial).
30. See ANDREW E. TAsUTZ, RAPEAND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 81-99 (1999)
(discussing the way the adversarial nature of a rape trial creates a further challenge to
rape victims seeking justice); see generally LEE MADIGAN & NANCY GAMBLE, THE SECOND
RAPE: SOCIETY'S CONTINUED BETRAYAL OF THE VICTIM (1991) (exploring the societal and
legal treatment of rape victims who come forward with their stories only to be further
abused).
31. See MADIGAN & GAMBLE, supra note 30, at 5-6 ('The 'second rape' is the act of
violation, alienation, and disparagement a survivor receives when she turns to others
for help and support.'); Dahlia Lithwick, Op-Ed, The Shield That Failed, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 2004, at WK1.
32. See discussion infra Part II.
33. See, e.g., SUSAN EsTRICH, REAL RAPE 3 (1987) (explaining why the author is "lucky"
in that she was raped by a stranger because "everyone agrees that I was 'really' raped").
34. See, e.g., Lithwick, supra note 31 (referring to the judicial system's virtual inability
to resolve date rape cases, especially those that receive massive media attention).
35. TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 372.
36. See, e.g., MARK COWLING, DATE RAPE AND CONSENT 81 (1998) (noting the difficulty
in distinguishing certain behaviors as consensual or nonconsensual); see also Lithwick,
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Yet in this kind of case communication often becomes muddied, "no"
may or may not mean "no," and fear may or may not be rational. As
opposed to many other legal concepts, date rape has no bright line.
This feature of date rape differentiates it from other forms of rape.37
In most rape trials, there is no question that a crime has occurred.
Conversely, in date rape trials, the central question for the jury is
whether a crime occurred. 8 If not, the physical interaction between
the accuser and the accused is legally deemed to be consensual sex.
The first part of this note details what happened specifically in
State v. Safi. The second part explores the concept of consent. The
third part examines the legal treatment of defendants in date rape
cases, particularly as explored through the lens of language orders.
The final part discusses feminist criticism of the legal treatment of
date rape complainants and language orders. After analyzing two
quite different perspectives, that of defendants' rights advocates and
that of date rape complainants' advocates, this note takes the posi-
tion that defendants facing charges of date rape should be afforded
the same protection as other criminal defendants - that is, they
should be presumed innocent until proven guilty. Although date rape
complainants have not historically been treated fairly,39 the over-
compensatory swing of the pendulum of justice undermines our sys-
tem when it presumes a defendant guilty. Exceptions cannot be made
if the purity of the legal system is to be maintained. Language orders
are a useful tool in restoring the overall fairness of date rape trials.
That said, many feminist critiques of today's legal treatment of date
rape victims are valid. The inadequacy of our legal system in provid-
ing redress for the victims of this nearly unknowable crime clearly
cannot stand. The solution cannot lie, however, in a compromise of
our most fundamental legal principles.
I. STATE V. SAFI
As mentioned, the first mistrial in State v. Safi resulted from a
hung jury, split 7-5.4o If the case simply concerned a man and a
woman having sex, albeit under the influence of alcohol, the jury
supra note 31 (noting that date rape cases center on the subtleties of an accuser's consent
and the defendant's ability to comprehend the accuser's behavior).
37. COWLING, supra note 36, at 81; ESTRICH, supra note 33, at 3-7.
38. Sherry F. Colb, Animosity Toward Kobe Bryant's Accuser, FINDLAW, Oct. 22,
2003, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20031022.html.
39. For instance, until recently in this country, a woman's physical resistance to
unwanted sex was a necessary element to the crime of rape, even if resistance meant
exposure to great harm. See ESTRICH, supra note 33, at 29-37.
40. Lithwick, supra note 6.
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might have had little trouble acquitting Safi. There was evidence, how-
ever, regarding both Bowen and Safi that the jury found troubling.41
Evidence was introduced that Pamir Safi had been accused of sim-
ilar acts twice before, though he had never been convicted." Bowen
was the third woman since 2001 to accuse Safi of sexual assault, and,
moreover, the accusations were nearly identical.43 In both of the prior
incidents, women who had become drunk fell asleep wearing clothing
but woke up naked."' The women awoke to find Safi having sex with
them.45 The first incident took place in a military barracks at Fort
Riley, Kansas in 2001; the second incident took place at a Kansas
City motel in 2004.46 The first incident was dismissed by a military
court.4" In the second incident, the complaining witness did not make
a complaint until several weeks after the incident, and the prosecutors
declined to press charges.48
The victims of these alleged crimes were allowed to testify at
Safi's trial.49 Normally, evidence of prior acts is not admissible in
order to prove action in conformity,5" but Judge Cheuvront allowed
the evidence to be used to "'show Safi's plan to have sexual relations
with a person who was incapable of resisting or appraising the nature
of her conduct."' 5 ' Clearly, then, the court recognized Safi's pattern
of, at a minimum, dubious sexual conduct.
Bowen's testimony also raised problematic questions. Following
the first mistrial, some of the jurors reported that three inconsistencies
in Bowen's story played a large role in the jurors' decision in favor
of acquittal.52 First, the nurse who examined Bowen testified that
Bowen claimed Safi had sex with her around two a.m.53 This of course
contradicted Bowen's assertion that she awoke at 7:15 a.m. to find
Safi having sex with her and that she had no memory of any events
after she left the bar.5 4 Next, Bowen testified that she had left Safi's
apartment approximately five to ten minutes after awaking, but
41. See Mabin, supra note 4 (noting that members of the jury doubted the veracity
of both Sail's and Bowen's testimony).
42. Id.
43. See id. (noting that the three accusers' allegations against Sai shared certain
commonalities).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. FED. R. EVID. 404(b); NEB. STAT. ANN. § 27-404(2) (2007).
51. Mabin, supra note 4.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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Clarence Mock presented evidence, including cell phone records, that
she laid in bed with Safi for an hour before he drove her home.55
Finally, Bowen testified that she instructed Safi to drop her off a few
blocks from her house, but on cross examination, she said he dropped
her off at her home.' The inconsistencies hurt Bowen's credibility for
some of the jurors.57 As one stated after the trial, "'I guess if you're
truly a victim, you don't need to lie to make your point."'5 8
Another point of contention emphasized by defense attorney
Mock was whether Bowen was as intoxicated as she claimed. 9 Over
the course of the evening, Bowen says she drank about four vodka
and Red Bull cocktails."0 According to two of the prosecution's own
witnesses, including Bowen's closest friend, Bowen did not appear
overly intoxicated.6 The implication, of course, was that if Bowen's
best friend could not see how drunk Bowen was, Safi could not be ex-
pected to have done so either. In her own defense, Bowen suggested
she may have been drugged.62 The police report indicates that video
footage from the night in question shows that Bowen had difficulty
walking when she left the bar and required support from Safi.63
For the jurors who sought to acquit Safi, the facts did not point
to Safi's innocence." Rather, they presented reasonable doubt.65 That
the prosecution's witnesses actually helped the defense only exacer-
bated the situation. One juror, who wanted to acquit, believed Safi
was not guilty.66 Another, Milt Foreman, simply felt he could not con-
vict a man he considered guilty without a better case.67 "'I prayed
they'd try this guy again .... Not guilty didn't mean we didn't think
he did it. "Not guilty" says the state didn't prove its case."'68
Based on these insights into the jury's deliberative process, one
would think that State v. Safi was just an ordinary case that could not
be resolved. But Bowen thinks the outcome hinged on Cheuvront's
language order.69 As five jurors, four of whom favored acquittal, noted,
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Bowen v. Cheuvront, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1023 (D. Neb. 2007).
63. Affidavit of Probable Cause, supra note 1, at 2.
64. Mabin, supra note 4.
65. Id.
66. See id. (noting juror Morrison's refusal to concede that Safi was guilty).
67. See id.
68. Id.
69. Bowen v. Cheuvront, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1024 (D. Neb. 2007).
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the case hinged on the credibility of Safi and Bowen, not on the lan-
guage order.70
The language motion probably was not filed with the intention
of making news. Similar motions are frequently filed and granted
throughout the United States.7 According to Mock, the purpose of the
motion was to level the playing field.72 The legal question of whether
a defendant committed sexual assault is one for the jury to answer
based on the evidence.7" "'Under the rules of evidence,"' asserts
Mock, "'witnesses can't reach legal conclusions."' 74 For Mock, the
issue of language in the courtroom fits within a broader, literary con-
ception of jurisprudence: "'Trials are competing narratives of what
happened .... They should not turn on politicized hyperbole. They
should turn on the facts."'7 5 Once a word like rape is used in the
courtroom, Mock says, "'the skunk is in the jury box and it's hard to
get the smell out."' 76
Bowen and her lawyers think that the language order signifi-
cantly impaired her case." On the one hand, they feel that Bowen's
testimony sounded unnatural because she had to pause frequently
over the course of her thirteen-hour stint on the witness stand.7"
Bowen thinks the jurors may have felt she was choosing to use
the word "sex" as opposed to "rape" because they were not aware of
Cheuvront's order.79 At the same time, Bowen and her lawyers, par-
ticularly Wendy Murphy, an infamous guest on political talk shows
and adjunct professor at the New England School of Law,s" argue that
the order did more than cause Bowen to pick and choose her words
with care - they think the order violated Bowen's First Amendment
rights.8 "'In my mind, what happened to me was rape,"' Bowen says.
70. Mabin, supra note 4.
71. See Mabin, supra note 23 (referring to a statement by Bruce Lyons, former presi-
dent of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, that there were comparable
orders in other jurisdictions); see also discussion infra Part III.
72. See Hammel, supra note 2.
73. Mabin, supra note 23.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Massey, supra note 3.
77. See id. (identifying Wendy Murphy as Bowen's attorney). See Mabin, supra note
23, in which Bowen notes the enormity of the ban's effect, and Wendy Murphy, one of
Bowen's attorneys, notes that even subtle alterations in language can have powerful
consequences.
78. See Mabin, supra note 23.
79. Id.
80. Durham-in-Wonderland, http://durhamwonderland.blogspot.com/ (Dec. 31,2006,
12:01 EST).
81. See Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Language Order 2-3, State v. Safi,
No. CR05-87 (Neb. Dist. Ct. July 11, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Motion for
Reconsideration].
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"'I want the freedom to be able to be able to point [to Safi] in court
and say, "That man raped me.""' 82
From Mock's perspective, of course, Bowen's First Amendment
claims are unfounded.' "'She, like any other witness, is subject to the
rules of evidence .... To say that there is a First Amendment right
of the witness to say whatever they want in a courtroom is a silly
notion."" Indeed, when Bowen sued Cheuvront in federal court to
stop him from violating her First Amendment rights, Judge Richard
Kopf agreed with Mock, noting in his opinion that "this case is not
'extraordinary.' Witnesses, who also claim to be victims, are subjected
to all sorts of limitations on their testimony in all sorts of criminal
cases in all sorts of courtrooms for all sorts of reasons. Ms. Bowen and
her case are not special."85
But to some critics of the legal system's treatment of date rape,
the language order is one more indication that the legal system is
fundamentally male in nature." As Michelle Anderson, Dean of the
City University of New York Law School, stated, "'[tihe notion that
the word rape is so charged derives from an historical willingness
to place a higher burden on rape victims who come forward."'8 7
Whether or not Anderson's statement is true, one cannot ignore
that Pamir Safi faced a potential fifty-year prison sentence for first-
degree sexual assault.' For Anderson, concern over the language
order was about the implications of the order for women as a sex;8"
for Safi, the order signified an attempt to prevent the prosecution
from labeling him as guilty of a very serious crime before the jury had
82. Mabin, supra note 23.
83. Massey, supra note 3.
84. Id.
85. Bowen v. Cheuvront, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1030 (D. Neb. 2007). Judge Kopf also
noted, however:
For the life of me, I do not understand why a judge would tell an alleged
rape victim that she cannot say she was 'raped' when she testifies in a trial
about rape. Juries are not stupid. They are very wise. In my opinion, no
properly instructed jury is going to be improperly swayed because a woman
uses the word 'rape' rather than some tortured equivalent for the word.
Id. at 1029 n.8. The legal conclusion of Bowen v. Cheuvront, in which Bowen sought to
have the federal court intervene in the state case by offering guidance to Cheuvront, was
not favorable for Bowen. Id. In addition to refusing to enter declaratory relief for Bowen
due to issues of federalism beyond the scope of this note, Kopf also sanctioned Bowen's
"passionate counsel" under FED. R. Civ. P. 1 1(b)(2) (albeit with a warning) because Bowen's
claim was "plainly lacking in support under any reading of federal law." Id. at 1030-31.
86. TASLITZ, supra note 30, at 81-82.
87. Massey, supra note 3.
88. Mabin, supra note 4.
89. Massey, supra note 3 (quoting Anderson as saying "[the language ban is] a way
of denying the woman's ability to describe her experience as she lived it").
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heard all of the facts.9" Clearly, these are very different conceptions
of the same situation.
In fact, the rift between these two approaches to date rape may
explain a good deal about the modern treatment of the crime. The
defense often wants nothing more than for their client's acquittal,
while the complainant often wants vindication not only for herself but
for other women, too.91 This may explain the fierce publicity gener-
ated around Bowen's case by victims' advocacy groups like Promoting
Awareness, Victim Empowerment ("PAVE").92 For them, Bowen rep-
resents an archetype: the Date Rape Victim Justice Ignores - an
archetype that certainly has a foundation in fact. On the other hand,
Safi and his counsel want to operate within the traditional framework
of the criminal justice system, using its rules and precedents, to seek
relief from criminal liability.93
Of course, some feminists argue that because the system is
male in nature it cannot work for date rape victims.' Indeed, for rad-
ical feminists like Sheila Jeffreys, Andrea Dworkin, and Catharine
MacKinnon, "social and cultural norms are intrinsically hetero-
patriarchal, and women's consent in hetero-patriarchal society is
always the less violent end of a continuum of sexual ownership, con-
trol, and use of women by men."95 The frustration of both groups
(the defendants who simply want to avoid jail time and the label of
"sex offender" by playing by the rules, and the women who want their
alleged attacker to be recognized as such, both for themselves and for
their sex as a whole, whether or not according to the rules) is repre-
sented in Cheuvront's acerbic declaration of mistrial before the second
trial even began:
The inescapable conclusion from the petition promoting the rally
[outside the courthouse on Bowen's behalf during juror selection]
is that Ms. Bowen and her friends hoped to intimidate this court
and interfere with the selection of a fair and impartial jury ....
The gatherings and the speeches ... were widely reported in the
media. Unfortunately, this resulted in publicity that would make
it virtually impossible to summon additional jurors who would be
untainted by the media reports on these activities.'
90. See id. (describing the word "rape" as a legal, conclusory term).
91. See Hammel, supra note 2 (quoting Bowen as saying "'I will do anything to make
sure that this doesn't happen to another woman . .
92. Massey, supra note 3.
93. See Hammel, supra note 2 (describing Safi's attorney's strategy of using the Rules
of Evidence to bar certain evidence).
94. Paul Reynolds, The Quality of Consent: Sexual Consent, Culture, Communication,
Knowledge and Ethics, in MAKING SENSE OF SEXUAL CONSENT 93, 94 (Mark Cowling &
Paul Reynolds eds., 2004).
95. Id.
96. Judge Declares Mistrial, supra note 17.
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In other words, Cheuvront felt that Bowen and PAVE had under-
mined the criminal justice system, gone outside of its boundaries and
prevented its usual operation. That Bowen felt obligated to do this
speaks to the manner in which (alleged) date rape victims feel that
the courts have failed them.97 At the same time, many defendants
feel exactly the same way.98 Whereas the system was patently unfair
to alleged victims until very recently, many men feel that feminist
concerns have taken hold of the justice system, placing a presumption
of guilt on alleged attackers.99 As Stuart Taylor and KC Johnson
write, "[s]imple morality, as well as the criminal-justice tradition,
argues for an equilibrium in the difficult area of rape law that protects
rape victims... without destroying the lives of innocent men."'"
II. THE ISSUE OF CONSENT
According to some estimates, 12.1 million women have been
raped at least once, and thirty-nine percent of those women have
been raped more than once."'1 More than eighty percent of these vic-
tims were raped by someone they know.0 2 One in four women in the
United States will be victims of rape or attempted rape at some point
in their lives.103
Rape, by its most basic definition, is sex without consent. °4
Notably, Susan Brownmiller wrote in 1975 that rape is "nothing
more or less than a conscious process of intimidation by which all
men keep all women in a state of fear."' 5 According to Mary P. Koss
and Sarah L. Cook, date rape is "a type of acquaintance rape that
involves a victim and a perpetrator who have some level of romantic
relationship."' ' Philosopher Mark Cowling extrapolates from this
definition's mention of "some level of romantic relationship," "an
97. See, e.g., Hammel, supra note 2 (noting Bowen's disillusionment with the legal
process).
98. See infra Part III (explaining that some men feel that date rape laws are biased
against them).
99. TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 372.
100. Id.
101. Heather Schmidt, Rape Statistics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RAPE 199, 199 (Merril D.
Smith ed., 2004).
102. Id.
103. Stephanie L. Schmid, Date Rape/Acquaintance Rape, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OFRAPE,
supra note 101, at 54.
104. COWLING, supra note 36, at 81.
105. SUSAN BROwNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 6 (1975).
106. Sarah L. Cook & Mary P. Koss, More Data Have Accumulated Supporting Date
and Acquaintance Rape as Significant Problems for Women, in CURRENT CONTROVERSIES
ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 97,98 (Mary M. Cavanaugh, Richard J. Gelles & Donileen R. Loseke
eds., 2d ed. 2005).
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agreement to meet for a date, flirtatious conduct at a party, [or] a
past relationship currently ended."' 7
Lois Pineau in turn defines date rape as "nonaggravated sexual
assault," or "nonconsensual sex that does not involve physical injury
or the explicit threat of physical injury."' ° Such a definition, while
quite serviceable, displays the essential difficulty associated with
dealing with date rape from a legal standpoint: Because there is no
violence involved, the question must be asked how and why the ac-
cuser had unwanted sex when there was no threat made to coerce
consent. Pineau's definition brings to the forefront the essentially
abstract nature of date rape.
The central reason why the concept of date rape can be so diffi-
cult to understand is that consent, as an independent concept, is itself
difficult to understand. In a discussion of aggravated rape, for in-
stance when an assailant jumps out of the bushes and rapes a jogger,
the victim clearly did not consent. In those situations, there is rarely
a question of whether the victim is or is not a victim. 9 Often the vio-
lence used to obtain the sex is itself evidence of the lack of consent,
and so the nature of consent need not be explored - a rape occurred
and the victim is a victim."' For this reason, stranger rape is usually
successfully prosecuted and the punishment is usually substantial."'
Any discussion of date rape, however, is far more complicated." 2
When consent requires discussion and conceptualization, the clear-
cut simplicity associated with prosecuting aggravated stranger rape
dissipates quickly. It is not so much consent's definition that stretches
the mind - one might easily define it as "[v]oluntary agreement to
or acquiescence in what another proposes or desires""' - rather, the
difficulty with consent is in its communication, or lack thereof."4
Cowling notes that if we require lack of consent to be absolutely
and unequivocally communicated no matter what, then laws will
107. COWLING, supra note 36, at 33.
108. Lois Pineau, Date Rape:A Feminist Analysis, in DATE RAPE 1, 1-2 (Leslie Francis
ed., 1996).
109. See, e.g., ESTRICH, supra note 33, at 3.
110. See, e.g., id. (describing Estrich's experience as a victim of violent rape); JOAN
MCGREGOR, IS IT RAPE 1 (2005) (noting that "[r]ape is conceived of in legal practice and in
the minds of many in society as a violent assault by a stranger.").
111. ESTRICH, supra note 33, at 3.
112. This is at least partially because of the conceptual problems we encounter when
trying to criminally define date rape. As Dorothy Roberts writes, "'[i]f rape is violence
as the law defines it (weapons, bruises, blood), then what most men do when they dis-
regard women's sexual autonomy is not rape.'" ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL
RELATIONS 91 (2003) (citing Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women's Autonomy,
69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 359, 362 (1993)).
113. 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 760 (2d ed. 1989).
114. COWLING, supra note 36, at 81.
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require "'the utmost resistance"' in order to show consent was not
given.115 This was the requirement of most American laws until very
recently."' On the other end of the spectrum, some would say that
any sex with an inebriated person is nonconsensual and therefore
rape." 7 Consent clearly must be informed for it to be meaningful."'
Furthermore, consent clearly must be given "against a background
of free choice."" 9 Consent is also complicated by the fact that it can
change over the course of a single interaction. Sometimes, sex can
even be consensual though not wanted. 20 In sum, consent can be
very confusing.
There is much subjectivity in consent, and where minds have not
met, consent can mean very different things to two people engaged in
a single act of intercourse.' This is often the result of a lack of clear,
meaningful communication.'22 Cowling notes that in many cases of
date rape, the man assumed the woman was consenting to more than
she did. 2 ' Often such a lack of communication results from a lack of
explicit discussion about the nature and scope of the consent given,
but consent is not something most people are accustomed to discuss-
ing in the heat of the moment.
The cultural script of sex as we know it involves so much un-
spoken communication that to verbalize much of it would essentially
ruin the experience. Joan McGregor notes that
[p]art of the cultural message about sex is that men are aggres-
sors or initiators of sex and women are not supposed to be eager
about sex, so they need to be persuaded or "forced" into it. Adding
to the problem are a significant number of women who say "no"
but still desire sex and may later consent to sex. 24
McGregor discusses a study by Muehlenhard and Hollabaugh in
which thirty-nine percent of the interviewed college students said
"no" at least once even when they intended to have sex.'25 Further-
more, McGregor observes,
115. Id.
116. Id. (examining "older American state legislation").
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 87 (observing that in many date rape cases, men perceived the women
to be consenting to more than the women intended).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. MCGREGOR, supra note 110, at 7.
125. Id. at 9-10.
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[w]omen after all often do not affirmatively verbally consent to
sex, and often admit to using rejection strategies even when they
desire sex. Is it then fair to men to hold them liable for rape when
the situations themselves are so ambiguous, particularly when
men believe (some would say justifiably) that the women's behav-
iors are consistent with consenting to sex? Is it not patronizing
to women, some will ask, to permit them to say later that they did
not consent, but at the time were unwilling to speak and let their
views be known? '26
Clearly, the communication of consent is often fraught with ambiguity,
and contemporary normative conceptions of sex only contribute to
the problem. As Cowling writes, "consenting behaviour, as it appears
in the limited research available, involves issuing ambiguous invita-
tions and responding warmly to (mainly physical) male advances....
[B]oth attempts to initiate sex and female acceptance are typically
non-verbal."'27
Although acceptance is very often expressed by a simple "yes,"
refusals, in contrast, are only rarely manifested by saying "no."'
128
Instead, refusals are very often made and understood by other
means.'29 As Gideon Calder writes, "[w]e do not speak literally, even
when making ourselves clear."30 It is for this reason that the defense
of mistaken belief in consent is in many ways improper: If we can
understand others in most communicative circumstances, it seems
logical that we should also be able to during sex. Moreover, a com-
mon feminist complaint about investigating rape from the perspec-
tive of the male is that it "defines whether a rape occurred from the
perspective of the accused rapist, not from the perspective of the
victim or even based on a social standard of unacceptable force or
of mutuality."131
Some countries do allow a mistaken belief in consent defense.
Famously, in England, the House of Lords held in the 1975 case
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Morgan that a man's mistaken but
good faith belief in consent, even if unreasonable, would relieve him
of criminal liability for rape.'32 American rape laws have not adopted
such an approach. Many state courts have, in fact, adamantly noted
126. Id. at 64-65.
127. COWLING, supra note 36, at 92.
128. Gideon Calder, The Language of Refusal: Sexual Consent and the Limits of Post-
Structuralism, in MAKING SENSE OF SEXUAL CONSENT 57, 59-60 (Mark Cowling & Paul
Reynolds eds., 2004).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. CATHARINE MAcKINNON, WOMEN'S LIVES, MEN'S LAWS 131 (2005).
132. [1976] A.C. 182 (H.L.) (appeal taken from U.K).
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that there is no intent requirement at all for rape."'3 Susan Estrich
does not see this as a moral victory for the United States, however."
As she notes, by leaving intent out of the prosecution, rape must be
either a strict liability crime, or a crime that "effectively excludes
[nonaggravated] simple rapes which present any risk that the man
could have been unaware or mistaken as to nonconsent." 1
35
Consent is so essential, in fact, and so intimately related to an
alleged attacker's ability to claim consent as a defense that some
have said it should be explicitly and verbally obtained before any
sexual encounter. 136 "Communicative sexuality" is a model of sexual
interaction in which verbal consent must be obtained for any sexual
act. 137 Pineau advocated for communicative sexuality in a 1989 jour-
nal article.13 1 In Pineau's view, the focus of a date rape trial should
not be whether the man involved believed that the accuser consented;
rather, it should be based on whether the complainant actually
consented.139
Only once that fact has been ascertained should an inquiry into
the alleged date rapist's reasonable belief in the accuser's consent
take place. 14 Communicative sexuality is a framework of sex itself.14'
It requires that partners in sexual activities communicate with one
another throughout their sexual experiences to ensure that the sex
is at all times pleasurable and never coerced.'42 It follows that if
133. Susan Estrich notes that at the time of publication in 1987, several courts had
held that there was no intent requirement for the crime of rape. ESTRICH, supra note 33,
at 94-95 (citing State v. Reed, 479 A.2d. 1291, 1296 (Me. 1984); Commonwealth v. Williams,
439 A.2d 765, 769 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); State v. Houghton, 272 N.W.2d 788, 791 (S.D.
1977); see also State v. Cantrell, 673 P.2d 1147, 1154 (Kan. 1983) cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
84 (1984); Commonwealth v. Grant, 464 N.E.2d 33, 35-36 (Mass. 1984); People v.
Hammack, 234 N.W.2d 415, 417-18 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Brown v. State, 207 N.W.2d
602, 609 (Wis. 1973) (as decisions not requiring intent). Estrich also cites to Reynolds v.
State, 664 P.2d 621 (Alaska App. 1983), holding that "the state must prove that the
defendant knowingly engaged in sexual intercourse and recklessly disregarded victim's
lack of consent," and People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975), "holding that the state
must prove the defendant intentionally engaged in intercourse and was at least negligent
regarding consent." Id. at n. 11.
134. See ESTRICH, supra note 33, at 95 (describing the problems of this approach).
135. Id.
136. See generally Pineau, supra note 108 (discussing the concept of communicative
sexuality as a possible remedy for what Pineau views as a male-centered legal philosophy
of consent).
137. Id.
138. The article, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, first appeared in LAW &PHILOSOPHY.
LESLIE FRANcIs, DATE RAPE xii (1996).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See id. at xiii (describing the inherent qualities of the communicative sexuality
model).
142. Id.
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communication does not occur, it is not reasonable for one to believe
one's partner is consenting. 43 Thus, during a trial for date rape, the
court would look for "evidence of an ongoing positive and encourag-
ing response on the part of the plaintiff' instead of asking what the
complainant did to express a lack of consent.'"
Questioning the defendant about what the accuser did to indi-
cate consent would be an efficient method of determining whether
a crime occurred because if the alleged victim did not explicitly and
verbally give consent, consent would not have been legally given.145
Canada adopted this approach in its criminal code.'46 There, however,
a lack of consent must be communicated.'47 Furthermore, it is not a
defense that the accused believed the accuser consented, if the ac-
cused did not take "reasonable steps.., to ascertain that the com-
plainant was consenting."'48 Likewise, there is no consent where a
complaining witness, who gave consent at first, changes her mind and
expresses her lack of consent by words or conduct.'49 Antioch College
adopted a "purer" form of communicative sexuality as a campus-
wide policy, in which "persons who wish to engage in sexual activity
must ask explicitly, and.., negative answers must be given their
normal meaning." 50
The most obvious problem with Pineau's notion of communicative
sexuality is that sex does not really work that way for many people.
Some females enjoy sex that is not communicative, preferring instead
to play the role of the passive or coy woman who wishes to be seduced
by a strong man.' Others enjoy domination or partaking in sado-
masochism.'52 If Pineau's framework is adopted, she essentially advo-
cates telling such women that theirs is a "false consciousness."'53 From
one point of view, then, communicative sexuality can seem paternal-
istic or condescending despite its good intentions.'
From a legal standpoint, consent is more than just communica-
tion, though communication is essential to it. When spoken aloud, as
in the model of sexual activity proffered by communicative sexuality,
143. Id.
144. Pineau, supra note 108, at 23.
145. See id. at 24 (presenting a hypothetical cross-examination of an accused date
rapist).
146. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. § 273.1(2)(d) (1992).
147. Id.
148. Id. § 273.2(b).
149. Id. § 273.1(2)(e).
150. Pineau discusses the Antioch policy. See Pineau, supra note 108, at 65.
151. See FRANCIS, supra note 138, at xiv-xv.
152. Id.
153. Id. at xiv.
154. See id. (examining the views of liberal feminist theorists).
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consent is a "performative utterance," in that the words are also an
action - the act of consenting.'55 Non-verbal consent is performa-
tive in the same way. Consent is clearly an essential issue in all rape
cases, but it is of particular importance for date rape. Date rape may
not be a violent crime, but it is a violation of autonomy, of a woman's
right to control her body, and of her power over her "territory."'56 This
is something the law wants to protect. As McGregor writes,
[c] onsent transforms existing moral and legal relationships often
making what was impermissible, permissible. This conception of
consent consequently must be normative since it changes exist-
ing rights and obligations. Consenting is not the same as merely
willing or wanting or other kinds of mental states or attitudes
because these have no power to change the normative universe,
which is why I cannot "consent" to someone using another per-
son's property. I can say the words, but they do not transform
the moral and legal universe. . . . In the case of rape, as in a
number of other areas, consent turns a criminal act into a non-
criminal one.'57
Legally, then, the presence of consent marks the essential difference
between consensual sex and rape, and the prosecution's job in a date
rape case is to establish the absence of this essential fact.'58
It is difficult enough to prove that an accuser did not consent
when she actually and meaningfully says "no," because often no one
but the accused rapist heard the magic word; it is therefore extraor-
dinarily harder to prove lack of consent when the complainant said
nothing. Alcohol only makes this more true. In general, although an
incapacitated person can "give" consent, that consent cannot be real
since the person cannot form the requisite mental state to offer mean-
ingful and informed consent.
159
If the person is too drunk to "understand the nature and quality
of what they would presumably be consenting to, then they are in-
capable of consent."'" Of course, holding a drunk man responsible
for having sex with a drunk woman seems in many ways uneven and
unfair.'61 That both people are not held responsible for their actions
seems to many people offensively paternalistic toward women and
155. COWLING, supra note 36, at 87.
156. MCGREGOR, supra note 110, at 106.
157. Id. at 115.
158. See id. (discussing the way consent changes legal relationships).
159. Id. at 140-41.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 152.
209
210 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 15:193
unfairly harsh to men.'62 Indeed, for Katie Roiphe, the very concept
of date rape is offensively paternalistic and, moreover, it dilutes the
reality of what she views as "real rape," meaning violent rape or rape
committed under the threat of violence.'63 In sum, the manner in
which we conceptualize consent can determine much of the ensuing
trial. The issue of consent, and therefore communication, can set a
rapist free or send an innocent man to prison. Consent is polarizing.
III. DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS
Those in favor of protecting men accused of date rape tend to
desire a fair trial, an even playing field, and the preservation of the
"innocent until proven guilty" standard."M These are fundamental
principles of our criminal system's traditional treatment of defen-
dants, but in the modern context of rape some feel these principles
have been willfully ignored or forgotten.' 5
The most surprising aspect of the issue of rape defendants' rights
is that some feminists explicitly adhere to a belief that these defen-
dants should not possess the above-mentioned traditional rights.'66
This sometimes stems from these feminists' belief in the need for
special rules in the arena of date rape.6 7 Possibly, however, this be-
lief sometimes arises from an over-compensatory desire to empower
women, due to their historically poor treatment in date rape trials.'"
162. See KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS 53-
54 (1993) (examining the inequality of date rape law, which holds drunk men accountable
for their actions, but not drunk women).
163. Id. at 81-82.
164. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
165. See TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 373 (arguing that the focus needs to
return to the defendant's rights, as opposed to focusing primarily on protecting the inter-
ests of the victim).
166. Wendy Murphy, attorney for Tory Bowen, said in reference to the Duke lacrosse
rape case: "Stop with the presumption of innocence. It doesn't apply to Duke," as well as
'Tm really tired of people suggesting that you're somehow un-American if you don't respect
the presumption of innocence, because you know what that sounds like to a victim? Pre-
sumption you're a liar." See Durham-in-Wonderland, supra note 80, at Dec. 31, 2006,
12:01 EST.
167. [A]s feminist legal scholar Susan Estrich acknowledged in her influential
writings on rape law in the 1980s, without corroboration a conviction is far
less likely for any crime. But Estrich argued that, since "corroboration may
be uniquely absent" in acquaintance rape cases, giving the same weight to
corroboration for rape as for robbery or felony assault was unfair to rape
victims.
Cathy Young, Who Says Women Never Lie About Rape?, SALON, Mar. 10, 1999, http://
www.salon.com/news/1999/03/cov_10news.html.
168. "For so long," Jim Cooney reflected after his client Reade Seligmann and
the other lacrosse players had been declared innocent, "rape victims were
poorly treated by the legal system and, as a result, there was much to be
ashamed of. In the 1970s and 1980s, the pendulum began to swing and we
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Some critics of the contemporary treatment of accused rapists be-
lieve the justice system has adopted the feminist, politically correct
weltanschauung in dereliction of the due process it owes all criminal
defendants.169
One example of the asymmetrical legal treatment of men in rape
trials involves the application of so-called rape shield rules of evi-
dence. 7 ° The purpose of these rules, adopted in the 1970s by each
state and the federal judiciary, is to prevent an accuser's sexual his-
tory from being exposed. 7' The rules thus protect the accuser from
embarrassment, unnecessary exposure, and inferences of consent
based on their perceived propensity for sexual interactions. 172 Some
states, however, have enforced rape shield rules in a manner that
tends to bar the admission of relevant evidence.'73 Furthermore, no
such protection exists for accused rapists, and their sexual history
is openly and often humiliatingly discussed and used as evidence in
courtrooms. 74 For instance, in the much publicized sexual assault
and battery case involving sportscaster Marv Albert,
[t]he judge allowed the prosecution to use testimony by other ex-
lovers of Albert about his alleged proclivity for rough sex. But
when Albert's lawyers asked to call witnesses who would testify
that the accuser had a history of making false assault and rape
accusations against former lovers, the judge said no, citing a
rape shield law to justify the blatant double standard. Albert was
forced into a plea bargain. 171
Although rape shield rules were instituted for an honorable purpose,
their application clearly can contribute to the asymmetrical treat-
ment of defendants.
entered an era in which rape victims were always believed and the defendant
was presumed guilty because it became wrong to question a victim of rape.
We see this in spades now in child molestation cases in which the same
issues have taken place. The pendulum somehow needs to be brought back
to the center to the point where legitimate victims do not have their entire
sexual histories revealed, but defendants are permitted to make legitimate
and real inquiries into the truth of what is said."
TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 373.
169. Id. at 371-72.
170. Id. at 380.
171. Id.
172. Lithwick, supra note 31.
173. TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 380.
174. See, e.g., id. (discussing how the prosecution in Mary Albert's 1997 assault and
battery case used his sexual history as evidence against him).
175. Id. at 380-81. Taylor and Johnson also cite the case of Oliver Jovanovic. In this
example, key emails that contained important evidence that Jovanovic's accuser consented
to the sexual activity in question were not admitted because they contained references
to sexual acts performed with other men, supposedly in violation of New York's rape shield
law. Id. at 380.
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Defendants' rights proponents point to a general shift in the
rhetoric used by today's media as a primary explanation for the con-
temporary asymmetrical treatment of accused and accuser.176 In the
1970s, jurors were often warned to "treat the woman's testimony with
special caution" per what is known as the Hale warning.177 In the sev-
enteenth century, Sir Matthew Hale wrote in an opinion that "rape...
is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder
to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent," his state-
ment serving as an undercutting influence on female accusers for
centuries after its issuance.
178
Cathy Young writes that because of the rise of feminism and the
legal reforms instituted due to feminism's influence, the Hale warn-
ing is no longer the rule of the day.' 9 Instead, she posits that the
"believe the woman" principle has replaced it." s "Feminists often de-
cry our culture's alleged eagerness to believe the 'myths of the lying
woman.' But it seems that it's the 'victims don't lie' myth that is
entrenched today.""'8 This sort of feminist zealotry has been notice-
ably present in a number of statements Wendy Murphy made on var-
ious television shows as a commentator on the Duke lacrosse case as
it unfolded.'82 Roiphe sees something akin to Young's entrenchment
176. See Young, supra note 167 (discussing the shift in attitude accompanied by the
use of "rape shield" laws).
177. Id.
178. Carol Pateman, Women and Consent, 8 POL. THEORY 149, 158 (1980).
179. See Young, supra note 167 (arguing that feminist rhetoric and the cich6 'omen
don't lie about rape" have replaced the Hale warning).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. KC Johnson has a collection of false or otherwise misleading statements made by
Murphy in the context of the Duke case on his blog. These (mis)statements range from
stating false statistics and facts specific to the Duke case, for example, "betting" that the
accuser had GHB in her blood, to "wholly unfounded speculation." Durham-in-Wonderland,
supra note 80, at Dec. 31, 2006, 12:01 EST. For example, Murphy stated that the players
were
"thinking, 'I was entitled to do this. I'm a member of a wealthy white boy's
school in a community that allow [sic] me to do what I want when I want.' ...
The e-mail shows that these guys were of the mind that whatever had
happened to this woman was just another day at the beach. They'll rape her,
sodomize her and tomorrow they'll kill her."
Id. This is not to call the veracity of Tory Bowen's claim into question, but to show that
her lawyer is known for adhering to an overzealous philosophy of feminism as well as
race and class consciousness. Id. Murphy's zealotry was also apparent when, as a visiting
scholar at Harvard, she wrote a letter to the Crimson regarding the fact that unknown
students had built a nine-foot penis out of snow in the middle of campus. Wendy J.
Murphy, Letter to the Editor, Supervision Absent, HARV. CRIMSON, Mar. 3, 2003, available
at http://www.thecrimson.comlarticle.aspx?ref-331253. Murphy wrote,
What if students had built a snow sculpture of a Nazi swastika or the
confederate flag? As a sculpture, a snow penis can't cause much direct harm,
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of myth in that she feels many feminists have adopted a "rigid ortho-
doxy" that sacrifices rationality and the ability to be self-critical in
favor of absolute "truths" that no one within the group may chal-
lenge." This absolutism, Roiphe implies, can become institutionalized
through the principles of political correctness, out of the contempo-
rary obsession with accommodating all and offending none, even if
it means cutting dialogue short."s Because of this institutionali-
zation of the politically correct, as Young points out, the injustice once
routinely faced by accusers in the courtroom has now shifted to the
accused instead of being eradicated altogether."8 5 As a result, "the
feminist position ... seems to leave no room for the presumption of
innocence when a woman accuses a man of violating her."1"6
Young, albeit a self-described "libertarian conservative," is
concerned with women's resulting ability to use rape charges as a
weapon by fabricating the crime.8 7 Similarly, Roiphe writes that al-
though it is possible that fabricated rape charges are isolated inci-
dents, some feminists seem quite willing to regard the truthfulness
of individual rape accusations as one factor to be "weighed in the
larger political balance: 'Did this member of a group sexually trained
to woman-hating aggression commit this particular act of woman-
hating aggression?' This sort of calculus, says Roiphe, foregoes
rational inquiry, and thereby certainty, in the name of "politicized
group psychology."' 89 This critique, if true, is disconcerting. Even
MacKinnon, a noted radical feminist legal philosopher, writes that
[i]t is not in women's interest to have men convicted of rape
who did not do it, any more than it is in women's interest not to
but it clearly serves as a powerful symbol of sexual dominance and gendered
violence. Would Harvard's administration have been so deafeningly silent
if students built a sculpture that symbolized race dominance or ethnic
cleansing?
Id. In response, Cathy Young asked, 'Does this mean that sexual intercourse is comparable
to the Holocaust, slavery, and ethnic cleansing" Cathy Young, Harvard's Peter Principle:
On the Inphallibility of the Ivy Leagues, REASON MAG., Mar. 11, 2003, http://www.reason
.comnews/show/31895.html.
183. ROIPHE, supra note 162, at 5. It is important to note that Roiphe is by no means
"antifeminist." She writes that "[i]t is out of the deep belief that some feminisms are better
than others that I have written this book." Id. at 7.
184. Id. at 5.
185. Young, supra note 167.
186. Id.; see also ROIPHE, supra note 162, at 41 (stating that in a rape case, "no one is
considered innocent until proven guilty").
187. Young, supra note 167; see also Cathy Young, The Rape Charge as Weapon, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 1, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial-opinion/
oped/articles/2006105/01/therape charge as weapon [hereinafter Young, Rape as Weapon].
188. ROIPHE, supra note 162, at 41.
189. Id.
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have men convicted of rape who did. Lives are destroyed both
by wrongful convictions and the lack of rightful ones, as the law
and the credibility of women - that rare commodity - are also
undermined.1"
Both sides of the argument can agree that only the guilty should be
convicted and that women have not historically been treated fairly in
rape trials. The agreement ends there, however, as defendants' rights
advocates and feminists disagree on which way the scale should tip
if it cannot be balanced. The essential question is whether the system
should be more inclined to protect innocent defendants, sometimes
at the expense of women who have been date raped, or whether the
system should be designed to ensure that more women's complaints
result in convictions at the expense of some innocent men. Impor-
tantly, most defendants' rights advocates wish only to yield to the
existing fairness mechanisms inherent in our legal system.191 Con-
versely, radical feminists believe that the "system" is male in nature
and therefore, by default, favors the male accused.192 Behind defen-
dants' rights advocates' desire for "simple fairness" lies an analogous
and deep distrust of the influence of feminism on the legal system's
treatment of rape defendants:
[T]he changes [to the legal system's treatment of rape] have gone
too far, driven by radical feminists' wild exaggerations of the ex-
tent of male sexual predation and female victimization and their
empirically untenable view that women never (or hardly ever) lie
about rape. In effect, radical feminists' push has been for a regime
that guarantees no rapist go unpunished, but any such regime
would inevitably convict a great many innocent men. Simple
morality, as well as the criminal-justice tradition, argues for an
equilibrium in the difficult area of rape law that protects rape
victims from undue humiliation without destroying the lives of
innocent men.193
Beyond issues of legal philosophy, it would be difficult to deny that the
current climate rushes to blame those accused of rape."M As a result,
innocent men, whether convicted or not, often have their credibility
190. MACKINNON, supra note 131, at 131.
191. See, e.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) ("[P]resumption of
innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law .... '), quoted in Mr. Bryant's
Motion to Preclude References to the Accuser as the "Victim" at 3, People v. Bryant, No.
03 CR 204 (Colo. Dist. Ct. May 3, 2004) [hereinafter Motion to Preclude "Victim"].
192. MACKINNON, supra note 131, at 131.
193. TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 27, at 372.
194. See id. (surmising that the change from doubting women accusers to the current
state, in which men accused of rape are presumed guilty, goes too far).
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destroyed.'95 This is not to say that anywhere near the majority of
rape accusations are false; rather, the legal system lacks strong safe-
guards to screen and prevent false accusations that often have dire
consequences." As Taylor and Johnson write, "[tierrible as it is for
a victim to see a rapist escape punishment, it is far, far worse for an
innocent person to be convicted of a sex crime." 9 '
Taylor and Johnson, in their case study of what John Grisham
calls "the pathetic rush to judgment"'98 in the Duke lacrosse rape
case, thoroughly explore this lack of safeguards." For Taylor and
Johnson, the influence of feminism and political correctness has re-
versed the presumption of innocence standard so that rape defendants
are now guilty until proven innocent."z ° Particularly when the alleged
crime receives great attention from the media and victim advocacy
groups, "[p]rosecutors and police come under especially intense public
pressure to quickly" arrest and prosecute the supposed rapist.20 This
sometimes leads to the hasty arrest of innocent men who, long before
their day in court, are treated in the media as guilty and, moreover,
monstrous. °2
Taylor and Johnson find that the pressure on prosecutors to
convict no matter what also increases the likelihood of prosecutorial
misconduct:0 3
Many overzealous prosecutors begin by being too reluctant to
question shabby or dishonest investigative work by police. Many
rush to judgment based on sketchy evidence; facing huge case-
loads, such prosecutors become complacent or lazy after seeing
twenty clearly guilty defendants in a row and wrongly presume
the guilt of the twenty-first. Many explain away late-arriving
evidence of innocence that would make any open minded prose-
cutor doubt his initial theory. Some allow close (or not-so-close)
judgment calls to be skewed by political ambition and play to the
crowd, or to the media mob, in high-visibility cases. °4
195. See id. (contrasting the need to protect the victim with the need to avoid "destroying
the lives of innocent men" unjustly accused of rape).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 27, at cover jacket.
199. See generally id. (exploring the story of three Duke University lacrosse players
falsely accused of rape and discussing the prosecutorial misconduct and later disbarment
of district attorney Mike Nifong, who led the smear campaign against the lacrosse players).
200. Id. at 371-86.
201. Id. at 360.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 358-59.
204. Id. at 358.
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Taylor and Johnson also point to the common practice of de facto
police perjury as a contributing factor in the asymmetrical treatment
of rape charge defendants.' Although the practice may have its origin
in officers' desire to get evidence admitted at trial that search and sei-
zure rules would otherwise bar, Taylor and Johnson allege that as it
becomes habit, police perjury can contribute to the conviction of inno-
cent men.2°' Taylor and Johnson's exploration of the harrowing expe-
rience of the falsely accused rapist illuminates the very reason why
the rape charge can be used so effectively as a weapon.2 °v Only after
accepting that rape charge defendants are treated differently, with
greater prejudice and fewer safeguards, can one also deem accept-
able language bans in the courtroom like the one in State v. Safi.
The fact that similar language orders are relatively common
is a testament to the legal system's growing awareness of this issue.
Hal Haddon, the defense attorney who successfully represented Kobe
Bryant in his much-publicized rape case, writes that defense attorneys
pretty routinely get orders precluding use of the term [victim] in
cases where consent is the defense. From a common sense stand-
point, if all parties are to be treated equally before the jury and in
the press, they should be referred to by their names and not by
some supposed legal status.2 s
It is important to note, as Haddon does, that these types of orders are
common only in date rape cases in which the defense is consent.0 9
This bespeaks the fact, discussed above, that date rape is fundamen-
tally different from violent rape. Where the victim is undoubtedly a
victim because she is bruised and bloody, there can be no doubt about
her status. Where, on the other hand, the allegation is date rape,
which, as discussed above, comes down to the nearly unknowable
issue of consent, to refer to the accuser as "victim" is, at a minimum,
to accept that a crime was committed.210 Indeed, one of the main
205. Id. at 361.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 372-73 (discussing the plight of the Duke lacrosse players who were
falsely accused); see generally Young, Rape as Weapon, supra note 187 (discussing the
danger of our society's over-compensatory swing of the pendulum of justice such that defen-
dants of rape accusations are presumed to be guilty, whereas "[a] couple of generations
ago, a stripper at a party with athletes would have been viewed by many as fair game.").
208. Email from Hal Haddon to Jason Wool (Nov. 5, 2007, 03:26:10 PM EST) (on file
with author).
209. Id.
210. Order Re Mr. Bryant's Motion to Preclude References to the Accuser as the
"Victim" at 2, People v. Bryant, No. 03 CR 204 (Colo. Dist. Ct. May 28, 2004) [hereinafter
Bryant Order].
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questions in a date rape trial is whether a crime took place at all.211
For the court to allow witnesses and the prosecution to give the im-
pression that a crime did in fact take place is ostensibly to answer a
question of fact that only a jury can properly answer.212 But referring
to the accuser as victim can be problematic for a number of other rea-
sons. As Haddon notes in his motion, "it is improper for the prosecutor
or the court to express a personal belief in the credibility of prosecution
witnesses or a personal belief in a criminal defendant's guilt." 213 More
importantly, allowing the accuser to be referred to as the victim in
a date rape case in which the defense is consent "violat[es] the pre-
sumption of innocence." 214 This is so at least in part because refer-
ring to the accuser as "victim" 'would wrongly suggest to the jury that
the Court holds a favorable view of the accuser's credibility," which
"dilutes the presumption of innocence."215 Orders banning use of the
word "victim" therefore serve to keep trials procedurally proper and
fair for defendants, as well as avoid the appearance of impropriety
for prosecutors.
In the Bryant case, the court found that there is no 'legal right
to be referred to as a 'victim' during trial" and that "[tihe common
understanding of the term 'victim' certainly implies that a person
has been the subject of a particular wrong or crime."216 Importantly,
this case raised a question of first impression for the Colorado dis-
trict court.211 All of the cases cited by Chief District Court Judge W.
Terry Ruckriegle to support his order were from other states, a fact
that bespeaks the relative recentness of language bans used to protect
defendants from presumptions of guilt. The cases cited came from
only three states, and the oldest one is from 1985.218 Clearly, lan-
guage bans like the one granted in Bryant are a recently developed
211. Motion to Preclude "Victim," supra note 191, at 4.
212. See id. (citing Allen v. State, 644 A.2d 982, 983 n.1 (Del. 1994); Jackson v. State,
600 A.2d 21, 24 (Del. 1991); State v. Wright, No. 02CA008179, 2003 WL 21509033, at *2
(Ohio App. July 2, 2003) (holding that the State must prove its case that there was in
fact a victim)).
213. Id. at 5 (citing Wilson v. People, 743 P.2d 415, 418 (Colo. 1987); People v. Wright,
511 P.2d 460, 463 (Colo. 1973); People v. Rogers, 800 P.2d 1327, 1328 (Colo. App. 1990);
People v. Martinez, 652 P.2d 174, 178 (Colo. App. 1981)).
214. Id. at 4.
215. Id. at 11 (citing United States v. Safley, 408 F.2d 603, 605 (4th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Johnson, 371 F.2d 800,804-05 (3d Cir. 1967); United States v. Meisch, 370 F.2d
768, 773-74 (3d Cir. 1966)).
216. See Bryant Order, supra note 210, at 2.
217. Id.
218. Id. The cases are from Delaware, Ohio, and Texas: Mason v. State, 692 A.2d 413
(Del. 1996); Allen v. State, 644 A.2d 982 (Del. 1994); Jackson v. State, 600 A.2d 21 (Del.
1991); State v. Wright, 02CA008179, 2003 WL 21509033 (Ohio App. July 2,2003); Veteto
v. State, 8 S.W.3d 805 (ex. Ct. App. 2000); Talkington v. State, 682 S.W.2d 674 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1985).
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tool for defense attorneys to maintain the presumption of innocence,
which may explain why many people might be shocked that such
orders are granted "pretty routinely." '219 In addition, it should be
noted that in granting Haddon's motion, Judge Ruckriegle ordered
that the court would continue to use the term "alleged victim" and
that the prosecution and prosecution witnesses were precluded from
using the term "victim." 
2 0
Given the reasoning behind banning the word "victim" from the
courtroom, the question arises why it should not be equally apropos
to ban other legally conclusive language such as "rape." Yet the lan-
guage ban in State v. Safi has drawn the ire of many, some of whom
even admit that language bans like the one in Bryant are reasonable.
Professor Robert Weisberg, a criminal law professor at Stanford Law
School, for instance,
has no problem ... with the fact that courts have gradually
jettisoned the word victim for the less loaded complainant. The
former proves too much. But he cautions that there is no value-
neutral word for unwanted sex and that the word intercourse
"understates what happens in a rape case." 221
Given the fact that bans on "victim" are used specifically in date rape
cases in which consent is the defense, however, using a word such as
"intercourse" under similar circumstances could at least come close
to describing what happened, despite Weisberg's admonition.222
That date rape is different has not escaped the attention of some
critics of the language order in State v. Safi. Dahlia Lithwick, for
instance, writes
[t]he fact that judges are not rushing to ban similarly conclusory
legal language from trial testimony - presumably one can still
say murder or embezzlement on the stand - reflects not just the
fraught nature of language but also the fraught nature of rape
prosecutions. We as a society still somehow think rape is differ-
ent - either because we assume the victims are especially fragile
or because we assume they are particularly deceitful. Is the word
rape truly more inflammatory to a jury than the word robbery?
Yes, the question of the victim's consent surely makes a rape trial
more complicated than some other kinds of criminal trials. But
the fact that the evidence may be more equivocal hardly makes
the underlying word more likely to incite blind juror outrage.22
219. Email from Hal Haddon to Jason Wool, supra note 208.
220. Bryant Order, supra note 210, at 3.
221. Lithwick, supra note 6.
222. As Clarence Mock says, "'You can have forced intercourse, or you can have legal
intercourse.'" Mabin, supra note 23.
223. Lithwick, supra note 6.
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Lithwick does not appear to grasp the full meaning of her statement
"rape is different." 224 As Haddon asserts, date rape trials are differ-
ent because the main question in these proceedings is whether a
crime was committed.225 This fact alone should be answer enough for
Lithwick's pondering over why judges do not make similar motions
in murder, embezzlement, or robbery trials. In those cases, no doubt
exists that a crime occurred, and so language bans would not be use-
ful. Indeed, it seems reasonable that the special nature of date rape
trials should warrant special procedures.
Bowen and her legal defense team find, however, that the special
procedure used in State v. Safi was not reasonable, and, further, that
it violated Bowen's constitutional rights.226 In a brief to the court re-
questing reconsideration of the language order Bowen's lawyers laid
out their argument against the language order. The brief asserted
that the language order "encroache[d] unlawfully on the victim's con-
stitutional rights.""22 The gravamen of this argument is that courts
are agents of the state and are thereby precluded from placing re-
straints on the speech of witnesses that substantively alters their
ability to describe their experiences.228 This argument proceeds under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. According to Bowen, the lan-
guage order impaired her "First Amendment right to testify truth-
fully before a judicial proceeding." 229 In Bowen's mind, if she cannot
give an account of her experiences using her own words, she is osten-
sibly being forced to lie on the stand."' Therefore, "the court's lan-
guage order is unconstitutionally coercive, essentially requiring the
victim to commit perjury." 23 1
Bowen also argued that the language order violated sound public
policy. 232 This argument stems from Bowen's feeling that the order,
by forcing her to use terms like "sex" and "intercourse," "effectively
forces the jury to hear characterizations of the charged conduct only
as nonharmful if not pleasurable behavior." 233 This argument relies
224. Id. Oddly, she does seem to understand the complexity of this statement in other
articles. See, e.g., Lithwick, supra note 31, at WK11.
225. Email from Hal Haddon to Jason Wool, supra note 208.
226. Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 81; see also Bowen v. Cheuvront, 516 F.
Supp. 2d 1021 (D. Neb. 2007) (discussed in detail in Part I).
227. Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 81, at 1.
228. Id. at 1-2 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948)).
229. Id. at 3 (citing Samora v. Poulin, 2007 WL 1385621 (D.N.H. May 9, 2007); Cossette
v. Poulin, 2006 WL 3751206 (D.N.H. Dec. 18, 2006); Benedict v. Town of Newburgh, 95
F. Supp. 2d 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
230. Id. at 4-5.
231. Id. at 5.
232. Id. at 5-8.
233. Id. at 5.
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on "cultural" definitions of "sex" and "intercourse."" 4 In her brief,
Bowen provided the following definition of "sexual intercourse":
"'penetration of the vagina by the penis."' 235 She also noted that this
dictionary entry refers the reader to the dictionary entry for the term
"coitus," defined as "'physical union of male and female genitalia
accompanied by rhythmic movements.'" 2 Bowen's brief then states,
"[n]one of these terms describe criminal or even harmful behavior."237
This statement once again fails to grasp the essential character of
date rape trials - the central question is precisely whether a criminal
or a consensual act has taken place. '
Although minds will differ over whether a "value neutral" term
for sexual intercourse exists, the definitions cited by Bowen in her
brief are hardly more than scientific or essentialist descriptions of the
physical act of sex. Neither definition mentions consent, nor do the
definitions mention the surrounding context in which sex occurs.23 9
Both definitions merely describe the physical actions that take place
when sex, whether consensual or nonconsensual, occurs. Whether
it is rape or not, the penis must penetrate the vagina. Bowen's brief,
however, somehow comes to the conclusion - unexplained - that
"rape is never sex and sex is never rape." 240
If one accepts that date rape trials are different for the above-
mentioned reasons, then it makes sense that terms that could be
used either in a consensual or nonconsensual context should be used
to describe the physical act that is the subject of the trial. Although
disallowing a woman who feels she has been raped from saying just
that may violate her First Amendment rights, little support exists for
this assertion. Bowen's brief cites only one case, from another juris-
diction, to support the notion that "a judge cannot ... control [the
words used by] lay witnesses." 24 ' Bowen asserted that the language
order could be constitutional if it applied only to prosecutors, follow-
ing other jurisdictions that have granted motions banning the word
"victim," but not in response to witness testimony. 2 The discussion of
the Bryant language order in this note, however, shows that Bowen's
234. Id.
235. Id. at 6 (quoting Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/
dictionary/sexual_intercourse (last visited Oct. 24, 2008)).
236. Id. (quoting Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, http'J/www.m-w.com/dictionary/
coitus (last visited Oct. 24, 2008)).
237. Id.
238. Motion to Preclude "Victim," supra note 191, at 4.
239. Motion for Reconsideration, supra note 81, at 6.
240. Id. at 5.
241. Id. at 8 (citing Jackson v. State, 600 A.2d 21 (Del. 1991)).
242. Id. at 7 (citing State v. Wright, No. 02CA008179, 2003 WL 21509033, at *2 (Ohio
App. July 2, 2003); Talkington v. State, 682 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985)).
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assertion is incorrect. In Bryant, the order applied to witnesses as
well as to the prosecution." s Needless to say, Bowen's motion was not
granted, which led her to seek federal intervention.
244
IV. SOME POINTS ON FEMINIST CRITIQUES OF DATE RAPE TRIALS
Up to this point, the defendants' rights perspective has relied on
a major assumption, namely that date rape is different from "real
rape" in that the trial's primary purpose is to establish whether a
crime occurred, whereas in other rape trials it is established that a
crime has occurred and the question is whether the defendant is the
perpetrator. Thus, the defendants' rights position embraces a perspec-
tive of date rape trials in which a determination of the existence of
consent is essential. Furthermore, to make this determination there
often must be evidence that the woman did not consent.
For many feminists, however, such a perspective is part and
parcel to the "rape culture" in which (they believe) we live. In this
"rape culture," "[tihe baseline assumption has been that women are
consenting to sex until there is significant evidence to the contrary.
The default is consent." 245 Although this view accepts the important
role consent plays in date rape,246 it does not accept the manner in
which we determine the existence of consent, particularly because his-
torically a woman had to give the utmost resistance to a man's sexual
advances to manifest a lack of consent.2 47 For exactly this reason, fem-
inists have proposed communicative sexuality as a legal model for
the determination of consent.248 Moreover, many feminists question
if rape victims can ever receive justice in a legal system that is funda-
mentally male in nature:
Ethics codes set broad limits on fair tactics [in the courtroom], but
within those limits trial lawyers are taught to be "[]ike Rambo...
tough, aggressive, and intimidating." Metaphors of litigation as
combat or sport dominate lawyers' professional magazines and
conversations. Lawyers speak of "playing hardball," "taking no
243. Bryant Order, supra note 210, at 3.
244. Bowen v. Cheuvront, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1023 (D. Neb. 2007).
245. MCGREGOR, supra note 110, at 104.
246. See id. at 106 ("Consent... figures centrally in unaggravated rape, providing the
key to understanding the moral wrongfulness and seriousness of this form of sexual
assault. Consent is important because we value autonomy, and consent provides indi-
viduals with a certain kind of power over their 'territory.'").
247. See COWLING, supra note 36, at 81 (mentioning that older state rape laws required
a woman to exercise "utmost resistance").
248. See supra notes 136-44 and accompanying text.
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prisoners," "destroying," and even "raping" witnesses. They brag
about "points scored" and "duels" won, and urge their colleagues
to have an "instinct for the jugular."249
This sort of maleness, some critics say, is directly woven into the
fabric of the adversarial system.25 ° More than that, some critics of
date rape trials specifically assert that the legal treatment of date
rape complainants forces them to submit to the normative values of
a chauvinist society.
251
Take, for instance, Andrew E. Taslitz's discussion of the date
rape trial of William Kennedy, nephew of Senator Edward Kennedy
of Massachusetts, in which the complaining witness was Patricia
Bowman. 252 Taslitz describes how defense counsel, on cross-exami-
nation, asked Bowman why she had taken so long to remove her
underwear after the alleged date rape:
Defense counsel, by his power to raise and enforce topics, led
Bowman to accept counsel's critical assumption: that how long
Bowman kept her panties on was relevant to whether she con-
sented. It is significant that counsel never said why feeling "dirty"
should have required Bowman to remove only one particular
article of clothing, her panties. But defense counsel did not need
to do so. He implied that if Bowman were telling the truth, then
the reason she felt symbolically dirty was because of the "polluting
powers of male seminal fluids." Therefore, if Bowman were indeed
raped, she would have quickly removed the source of her moral
pollution, her panties.... If she felt dirty but did not remove her
panties, counsel suggested, then the locus of the dirtiness could
not have been the physical acts of penetration and ejaculation.
The locus of filth lay elsewhere: in Bowman's guilt about having
impersonal, consensual sex with a man she had just met.25 '
Taslitz also describes how Kennedy's counsel made much out of the
fact that Bowman had, at one point, removed her pantyhose, because,
Kennedy's counsel implied, "the absence of pantyhose, an item of
clothing 'guarding' the female genitalia, bespoke a woman of deep
sexual craving." 2  By eliciting this sort of testimony, asking indirect
questions that imply negative characteristics, and asking and with-
drawing improper questions, defense counsel has the power to use
249. TASLITZ, supra note 30, at 81.
250. Id. at 81-82.
251. MACKINNON, supra note 131, at 131-34; TASLITZ, supra note 30, at 81-99; Calder,
supra note 128, at 61-63.
252. TASUTZ, supra note 30, at 82-84.
253. Id. at 83.
254. Id. at 84.
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the legal system, as well as the mores of the jurors, against a woman
who has legitimately been date raped.255 Furthermore, the tactical
use of objections and interruptions, particularly when the prosecu-
tion asks a question of the complainant that "calls for a narrative,"
can have the effect of making the testimony of complaining witnesses
less believable and, more importantly, harrowing for the speaker." 6
This can have the effect of silencing the current complainant, as
well as deterring others from wanting to take the stand in date rape
trials.5 7 The conclusion that some feminist critics reach, then, is that
if the legal rules enable this sort of treatment of date rape complain-
ants, then the rules are themselves male in nature.258
This institutionalization of maleness into the legal system is, in
turn, part of a larger cultural problem in which rape is itself a form
of male domination of women. As MacKinnon explains:
Sexual violation symbolizes and actualizes women's subordinate
social status to men. It is both an indication and a practice of in-
equality between the sexes, specifically of the low status of women
relative to men. Availability for aggressive intimate intrusion and
use at will for pleasure by another defines who one is socially
taken to be and constitutes an index of social worth. To be a
means to the end of the sexual pleasure of one more powerful is,
empirically, a degraded status and the female position."9
Feminist critics therefore suggest that in a patriarchal system, if
women can only consent or not consent, then they are fundamentally
viewed from a cultural point of view as "rapeable. 26 ° If this is the
case, then "consensuality [sic] does indeed seem to be analytically
irrelevant."26 ' One who accepts this conclusion clearly cannot also
agree with the central assumption of the defendants' rights position,
namely that date rape adjudication is different because it seeks to
determine whether there was consent (no crime) or not (crime). If
one cannot accept the notion of consent, one also cannot accept the
position that date rape is different.
255. Id. at 81-91, 97.
256. Id. at 98.
257. TASLITZ, supra note 30, at 137.
258. MACKINNON, supra note 131, at 131-34; id. at 81-99; Calder, supra note 128, at
61-63.
259. MACKINNON, supra note 131, at 129; see also Calder, supra note 128, at 61-62
(stating that "[rnape, then, is one of culture's many ways of'feminising' women. It follows
a sort of pre-existing script which defines some of us (men) as legitimate subjects of
violence, and others (women) as its rightful objects. Hence women are cast into the role
of victims in a script not of their own authorship").
260. See Calder, supra note 128, at 62 (discussing the "rape script" and reform).
261. Id. at 63.
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Although there is no reason to believe that Tory Bowen adheres
to a radical feminist ideology, it seems clear from her opposition to
the language order in her case that she feels she is being forced to
accept a male rule in a male system. 2 In her mind, she did not con-
sent, therefore, she should have the opportunity to say so in whatever
way she desires." 3 The contrast between the female desire to "have
my day in court" with the defendants' rights advocates' desire to "play
by the rules" elucidates at least one possible conclusion about today's
legal system: It cannot work for both men and women in the context
of date rape trials.264
CONCLUSION
For the purposes of this note, it may be stipulated as fact that
date rape trials have historically not been friendly to complain-
ants.26 At the same time, the defendants' rights position holds that
various reforms instituted in recent decades under the guise of
making date rape trials fairer for the complaining witness have in
fact gone too far, at the expense of a fair trial for the defendant as
well as the "innocent until proven guilty" principle.266
Although this note accepts that the need for reforms regarding
the legal treatment of complainants was great due to the historically
poor treatment of women who allege date rape, it nonetheless takes
the position that certain special procedures must be available to
262. See Mabin, supra note 23.
263. Id.
264. Somewhat ironically, in light of her other article discussed in this note, Lithwick
wrote particularly incisively on this issue in a 2004 New York Times piece in which she
recognized that fairness to defendants and fairness to complainants are, to some extent,
mutually exclusive concepts. Lithwick, supra note 31, at WK11. She wrote:
This well-intentioned reform in our rape laws [i.e. institution of rape shield
laws] has led to two unappealing alternatives: Either the defendant's legal
presumption of innocence is flipped on its head, since rape shield laws un-
ambiguously deny him access to potentially exculpatory evidence. Or - as
a practical matter - the woman's sexual history goes on trial regardless,
permitting humiliating public scrutiny often likened to a second rape.
Id. Lithwick is not a radical feminist, of course, and it is doubtful that she would take her
position to the extreme. In her statements, she appears to blame the media for exacer-
bating a situation that could potentially be handled by the courts in a vacuum. 'In the
Bryant case, by insisting on its constitutional right to act as watchdog, the press gained
access to the most lurid details of the accuser's intimate life. Consequently, high-profile
rape trials allow the media to do far more damage than rape shield laws ever tried to
mitigate." Id. As shown by the events of Bryant, "by detailing the sexual conduct of Mr.
Bryant's accuser in the seventy-two-hour period surrounding her [alleged] rape, the press
will eviscerate the entire purpose of the Colorado rape shield law[.]" Id.
265. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
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defendants of date rape allegations in order to ensure that they may
experience a fair trial.267 Because language orders barring "victim"
have come to be accepted in date rape trials in which consent is the de-
fense (largely due to the recognition, either conscious or subconscious,
that date rape trials are different than other rape trials), the same
logic should apply to language orders barring "rape" in similar circum-
stances, namely date rape trials in which consent is the defense.26
As an addendum, however, although this note takes the position
that terms like "intercourse" are value neutral, there may be validity
in Bowen's claim that having to pick her words carefully caused her
testimony to seem less credible to the jury.269 Therefore, if "rape" lan-
guage orders are to be issued in the future, it seems only fair for the
judge to instruct the jury that the order is in place, and that the com-
plainant will not be able to use legally conclusive terms. Furthermore,
reforms may be necessary to ensure that evidentiary rules and the
broader legal treatment of date rape defendants do not deny defen-
dants equal protection of the law, although this topic is beyond the
scope of this note.27° Although radical feminist critiques of date rape
adjudication may be valid in theory, in practice it is impractical to
propose a mass overhaul of our entire legal system in favor of a non-
patriarchal one.271 This note can be meaningful only under a less rad-
ical lens. Historical unfairness to one group cannot be corrected by
imposing similar unfairness on another. 2 If one can accept that the
legal system we have is the one within which we must work, however,
then it is far from impossible to imagine that a date rape defendant's
right to a fair trial, with its corresponding presumption of innocence,
267. See supra Part III.
268. See supra Part III.
269. See, e.g., Mabin, supra note 23 (discussing the effect of language orders on a jury's
perception of Bowen's credibility).
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(citations omitted)); see also Clifford S. Fishman, Consent, Credibility, and the Constitution:
Evidence Relating to a Sex Offense Complainant's Past Sexual Behavior, 44 CATH. U. L.
REV. 709, 722 (1995); Shawn J. Wallach, Note, Rape Shield Laws: Protecting the Victim
at the Expense of the Defendant's Constitutional Rights, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 485,
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can be maintained without sacrificing the dignity of and fairness to
date rape complainants. Language orders, when correctly issued and
in the proper circumstances, are a step in that direction.
Finally, it is worth noting that, as some of the jurors remarked,
Pamir Safi probably was guilty.2 3 The police report offers objective,
factual data in support of this proposition, such as reference to video
footage of Safi and Bowen leaving the bar together in which Bowen
"appeared to have great difficulty walking and was being assisted
by" Safi, and the fact that when Bowen underwent examination by
a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner approximately twelve hours after
Brothers closed, her blood alcohol content was "still over .10. '' 274
Evidence also showed a pattern of behavior of Safi having sex with
women too drunk to consent.275 Facts like these, when properly pre-
sented in court under the applicable rules of evidence, are enough to
convict. Belief in Safi's guilt does not change the fact that the pre-
sumption of innocence is fundamental to our criminal justice system.
The presumption of guilt frequently associated with date rape can
only move society closer to authoritarianism. Tools such as language
orders are a means of preventing this outcome.
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